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The Missing ‘E’: Radical Embodied 
Cognitive Science, Ecological Psychology 
and the Place of Ethics in Our 
Responsiveness to the Lifeworld
Phil Hutchinson
Cognitive science as an interdisciplinary movement is undergoing 
something of a change. After fifty years of being dominated by Cartesian 
representationalism, recent years have witnessed a rising interest in 
alternative approaches, which emphasise the embodied, embedded, 
extended and enacted nature of mind-world relations and our respon-
siveness to loci of significance in our environment. These approaches 
have been, variously, referred to as 4E cognition (Menary, 2010), ‘The 
New Science of the Mind’ (Rowlands, 2010), simply as Enactivism 
(Stewart, Gapenne, & Di Paolo, 2010), including its radical variant, 
Radical Enactivism (Hutto & Myin, 2013) and as Radically Embodied 
Cognitive Science (Chemero, 2009). The interest in such approaches 
has generated renewed interest in Ecological Psychology and the theory 
of affordances (Gibson, 1979; Heft, 2001; Chemero, 2009; Van Dijk, 
Withagen, & Bongers, 2015), which also emphasises the embodied, 
embedded, extended, and enacted nature of mind-world relations, 
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while rejecting representationalism. Indeed, increasingly one now finds 
work which advances a theory of affordances by drawing on Enactivism 
and Dynamical Systems Theory (e.g. Chemero, 2009, chap. 7.6) and 
amalgam, or Frankenstein, theories, which comprise of a theory of 
affordances and enactivist insights while also, somewhat oddly, retain-
ing talk of representations (e.g. Hufendiek, 2016, chap. 5), including 
by those, such as Jesse Prinz, who until recently had been high-profile 
standard bearers for traditional Cartesian representationalist computa-
tional theorising about cognition (see Shargel & Prinz, 2018; and con-
trast with: Prinz, 2003).
So, what gives? Is this a new dawn, one which promises to accommo-
date those who have remained opposed to the programme of cognitive 
science? Or is it a case of more of the same?
Well, first we’d do well to tease-out some of the differences, for there 
are a range of views which, as Menary (2010) points out in his introduc-
tion to a journal special edition on 4E cognition, mean that there is little 
homogeneity here. For, on the conservative wing of 4E approaches we 
find Andy Clark, who accommodates representationalism and function-
alism, and is happy to endorse weak cognitivism (see Menary, 2010, 
p. 460), in addition to those such as Hufendiek (2016) and Shargel and 
Prinz (2018) who appropriate the language of affordances and Enactivism 
while still talking of representations. In contrast, on the radical wing we 
find those who all-but completely reject representations such as Hutto 
and Myin (2013) and Chemero (2009) in addition to traditional 
Gibsonian Ecological Psychologists such as Harry Heft (2001). In what 
follows I will not be interested in weak cognitivist 4E approaches. I’m 
interested here in the genuinely radical alternatives to traditional, 
Cartesian representationalism. The alternative I will focus on here, there-
fore, will be Anthony Chemero’s work, which amounts to a sophisticated, 
contemporary attempt to update the theory of Affordances by incorpo-
rating Dynamical Systems Theory that emerges out of Enactivism, with 
the aim of providing a genuinely radical alternative to Cartesian 
representationalism.
Before I progress, a note of clarification regarding my objectives in this 
paper. I do not here seek to provide a definitive critique of representation-
alism. Rather, my starting point is that there is increased interest in alter-
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natives to representationalism within the community of cognitive 
scientists. I seek only to explore some of the reasons why researchers are 
looking for alternatives to representationalism, and I do so merely as a 
precursor to examining one of the candidates for an alternative: Chemero’s 
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Furthermore, my criticisms of 
Chemero should not to be taken as defences of or a reason to return to 
representationalism. Far from it. I agree with Chemero (and Hutto and 
Myin) that representationalism should be rejected. My disagreement, if 
there ultimately turns-out to be one, is on how best to conceive of a via-
ble alternative to representationalism.
 1. Cartesian Representationalism
Since its origins as an interdisciplinary research programme, cognitive sci-
ence has operated within the Cartesian tradition. One way to see how this 
pans out is to look at the way in which traditional cognitive science answers 
the question as to how we respond to loci of significance in our environ-
ment. The cognitivist’s way is to propose that such loci of significance have 
causal impact on our senses, which trigger mental representations (we 
might talk of elicitation files with semantic content here), that semanti-
cally represent a specific locus of significance in the form of a proposition. 
On this view, the meaningful content of our thoughts does not reside in 
the loci of significance, but is inferred from the sensations triggered by the 
causal impacts  issuing from those loci of significance; on this view,  the 
meaning the world has for us is not ‘out there’ in the world, beyond our 
skin, but in the head, in some sense. Variations on this view have domi-
nated cognitive science for the past fifty years and the programme set itself 
the task of providing a scientific explanation, often drawing upon compu-
tational metaphors, framed by this philosophical account. However, after 
50  years, it seems increasingly clear that representationalist- cognitivism 
has failed to establish itself as (Kuhnian) normal science.
This is, perhaps, a controversial claim, so what warrants it? Well, it is 
this: Representationalist Cognitive Science is still at the pre-paradigmatic 
phase because, as its many detractors have pointed out and the practices 
of its practitioners so often demonstrate, representationalism cannot 
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overcome the problems it faces without repeatedly bringing into question 
its philosophical foundations. For example, in the area of primate cogni-
tion Louise Barrett (2011) has demonstrated how representationalism 
distorts the research findings. Similarly, Evolutionary (or ‘Sussex’) robot-
ics led numerous researchers to reject representationalism and advocate 
alternative, phenomenological foundations; see, for example, Di Paolo 
(2003), among others. Normal science proceeds without having to per-
petually refer back to, tinker with, and revise its philosophical founda-
tions. (Representational) Cognitive science simply cannot plausibly claim 
to be normal science because such a big part of the job of the cognitive 
scientist is still concerned with revision and arguments in defence of the 
under-siege philosophical foundations. Let’s take time to consider some 
reasons why.
 2. Challenges to Representationalism: 
Rejecting Internalism
In his 2002 book on the Philosophy of Mind, Externalism, Mark 
Rowlands (Rowlands, 2002) takes the reader on a tour of many of the 
Twentieth Century’s philosophical arguments against internalism and for 
content externalism in the Philosophy of Mind. The tour ranges from 
Sapir-Whorf, Thomas Kuhn and Putnam-Burge Twin-Earth arguments, 
to Husserl, Sartre, Heidegger and Wittgenstein. It is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to rehearse all of the arguments against content internalism, 
or even those which Rowlands discusses in the first six chapters of his 
book, I’ll simply illustrate why we might reject the representationalist 
picture by invoking one argument, which is traceable back to Wittgenstein 
(and, on some readings, Frege) and which one finds most clearly argued 
in the work of radical contextualist philosophers of language, such as 
Avner Baz (2012), Frank Ebersole (2002), Lars Hertzberg (2001) and 
Charles Travis (2008). I focus on this particular argument because ele-
ments of it are relevant when we come to appraise contemporary non- 
representational arguments later in the chapter.
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 2.1. A Radical Contextualist Challenge to Content 
Internalism and Representationalism
The problem for representationalists, as radical contextualist philosophers 
state it, is as follows: representations are theorised as being internally 
located and propositional in form, such that we represent the world in a 
thought which has propositional form. However, the problem is that propo-
sitions shorn of context, as they are when abstracted from their use by 
people, in contexts and on occasions, as they are when they are psychose-
mantic propositions, residing in modules and elicitation files, fail to rep-
resent and they are indeterminate with regards to the worldly events they 
putatively represent. Let us consider some of the examples one finds dis-
cussed in such work.
Imagine one person telling another ‘there is coffee on the table’. Or, if 
you prefer, ‘milk in the fridge’. In both cases, the propositional, or seman-
tic content that one might attribute to the proposition, separated from an 
occasion of use, falls short of representing the relevant content which that 
proposition has when employed by a person with interests, on an occa-
sion and in a context. For example, ‘there is coffee on the table’ taken as 
this string of words, but without specifying an occasion of use, might 
include the dried, spilt coffee on the table. It might include the two-day- 
old dregs of coffee in the cup on the far end of the table, left there by John 
on Tuesday. And it might include the several cups of freshly brewed cof-
fee, which have already been poured and distributed to those already sat 
round the table. However, if this sentence is uttered to you, as you arrive 
for the breakfast meeting, you know that the coffee referred to in the 
statement does not include the spilt, dried coffee, it doesn’t refer to the 
two-day old dregs and nor to the coffee already given to your colleagues 
who arrived before you. You look for the coffee pot. The dried, spilt cof-
fee, the two-day old dregs, and the cups of coffee in possession of col-
leagues only come into play as possible referents when we merely focus on 
the statement as a linguistic item, as philosophers and cognitive scientists 
are wont to do, and as it is when posited as psychosemantic mental rep-
resentation, in abstraction from the actual contexts in which such state-
ments are made.
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To illustrate further, let’s consider Charles Travis’s milk example (Travis, 
1989, p. 156) and Avner Baz’s discussion of it (Baz, 2012, p. 142). Travis 
tells us that Hugo, who we are told is engrossed in a paper, remarks to Odile
“I need some milk for my coffee”. Odile replies, “You know where the milk 
is”. Suddenly defensive, Hugo replies: “Well, I don’t really know that, do I? 
Perhaps the cat broke into the refrigerator, or there was just now a very 
stealthy milk thief, or it evaporated or suddenly congealed”. (Travis, 1989, 
p. 156; quoted in Baz, 2012, p. 142)
The point of the example is that Hugo’s reply to Odile is, as Travis remarks, 
not merely absurd but fails as a counter to Odile’s reply. For much the same 
reason as me taking a cup of coffee out of my colleague’s hand, having been 
told ‘there’s coffee on the table’, as I arrived at the breakfast meeting, would 
have been absurd, Hugo’s response is an absurd response when taken as a 
response to the sense of the utterance communicated to him on this occa-
sion, that is to say, as a response to what Odile has said to him, even though, 
grammatically-speaking, as it were, no rules have been violated. The sense of 
an utterance is essentially contextual, or in Travis’s terms, occasion sensitive.
This said, we can go further than does Travis here, as Avner Baz has 
pointed out. Travis argues that while the formal meaning of the sentence 
‘you know where the milk is’ allows, grammatically speaking, for a 
response along the lines Hugo offers, the sense of the utterance, as spoken 
by Odile on this occasion, does not invite the kinds of counter-examples 
that Hugo puts forward, hence the absurdity of his response. For Travis, 
this demonstrates that the question as to whether utterances in response 
to Odile’s words amount to pertinent counters or absurd mis-fires, so to 
speak, is only settleable in a context, on an occasion of use. The meaning 
one might claim to be formally contained in the sentence falls short of 
fixing the sense of the sentence, such that we might have the resources to 
draw the line between absurd and pertinent responses. Travis is surely 
right on this, but Baz wants to go even further. Baz argues that Odile’s 
remark should not even be read as an attribution of knowledge, despite 
what the words might (mis)lead us into believing as analysts. Indeed, Baz 
believes Travis has himself been misled as to the real lesson that emerges 
from his own example, and he has been so because he still operates with 
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an account of formal word meaning, prior to sense-making acts of speech 
on an occasion. For Baz, the context Travis provides us with in laying-out 
the scenario in which Odile and Hugo are embedded, would suggest that 
Odile’s remark is a rebuke rather than a statement which attributes 
knowledge (location of the milk) to Hugo.
Another way of stating this disagreement between Travis and Baz 
would be as follows: Travis, following Frege, minimally allows for words, 
in sentences, as having meaning in lieu of their employment by someone 
on some occasion, while it is the occasion which gives them sense and 
thereby renders them useful. One of the ways that the occasion of use, in 
conveying sense on our utterances, makes our words useful to us can be 
observed by the way that it allows us to see the line between absurd and 
pertinent responses. Baz goes further, he wants to fully break free of the 
Fregean tradition by denying formal word-meaning and focussing exclu-
sively on the sense a sentence has in its employment by a person with 
interests, on an occasion, in a context. On this view, we forego the claim 
that certain strings of words have meaning prior to their employment, 
and instead see the role words play for a language user as akin to the role 
tools have for a craftsman, which are put to use by people, with interests 
and purposes, in contexts and on occasions. It is in recovering these inter-
ests and contextual factors through careful close observation of language 
use that we make the sense of an utterance visible to us. Another way of 
putting this disagreement is, perhaps, as follows: Travis wishes to argue 
for the primacy, and indeed essential or ineliminable role, of the prag-
matic (over syntactic and semantic) contribution to the sense of an utter-
ance. Baz wants to argue for the use, by people, in contexts, being the 
only factor in establishing the sense of an utterance.
There’s a deeper point here too, one on which both Baz and Travis 
would, I believe, agree. What is lost in any formal analysis of language, 
where language is analysed in abstraction from its sites of use, is pre-
cisely that which is central to the sense our language has when used by us, 
and that is its normativity. When we see the exchange between Odile and 
Hugo in its context, as an exchange between these two people, we see that 
the sense of their utterances is inseparable from evaluative norms. Odile 
is rebuking Hugo because he asked her to provide him with milk in an 
underhand, indirect and impolite way, by stating his ‘need’ for milk. 
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Odile rebukes Hugo because she, perhaps, resents being expected to fetch 
the milk for Hugo, or perhaps she resents the way he ‘asks’ indirectly or 
in a way which has ‘plausible deniability’, by not overtly asking but 
instead stating a ‘need’ in the hope Odile, as this person with whom he 
has this relationship, will take the hint and meet his ‘need’. What is clear 
is that what appears on the surface like a statement from Hugo, is in fact, 
when seen in context, a hint or a request which Odile understands as 
containing an expectation (which in turn she perhaps considers to be 
gendered, entitled or arrogant). In response, what might appear, formally, 
like a knowledge attribution by Odile, is, when seen in context, a rebuke 
to Hugo that draws upon Odile’s evaluative perception of the event.
Now, the temptation to which many succumb when confronted by 
such examples and analyses, is to suggest this is all window-dressing, and 
that the meaning is contained in the words or sentences. However, if we 
pursue this line of argument we ultimately ignore the actual sense of the 
exchange between Odile and Hugo, and we therefore ignore what it is 
they are doing. Any discussion we then have about their words and using 
their names as ‘speakers’ of those words becomes a discussion which is 
not about Odile and Hugo or this exchange but actually an unrelated 
discussion about the interests of the analyst.
So, things don’t look good for representationalism. Content is simply 
not available in abstraction from the use people make of language in con-
texts and on occasions. Propositions do not represent; they simply cannot 
do the work representationalists demand they must, as internally-located 
bearers of content, because they can’t represent, because they do not have 
sense, in abstraction from being put to use in a context by a specific per-
son with interests, on an occasion.
To summarise, the arguments put forward by radical contextualists 
such as Travis and Baz, and particularly those of Frank Ebersole, suggest 
that propositions, as units of analysis, do not bear content in abstraction 
from their being embedded in the practice of language use, on occasions 
and in specific contexts, by language-using members of a social order, 
who themselves have learned to use the language as part of their process 
of maturation and enculturation. Moreover, when we analyse language- 
in- use, we find that the sense that language has is not purely descriptive 
or epistemic, but that it plays normative and evaluative roles. Moreover, 
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the normative and evaluative are not separable from the descriptive. As 
Hilary Putnam once put it, it is a ‘fallacy of division’ to believe you can 
separate the normative from the descriptive, ‘Describing and evaluating 
are simply not independent in that way.’ (Putnam, 1992, pp. 350–1). So, 
representationalism seems to demand of language a number of things 
observation of language use shows it doesn’t offer: it demands 1. that 
propositions taken as discrete linguistic items represent the world, or 
states of affairs in the world, which is something that in abstraction from 
their use by members of a social order, on occasions, in contexts, they 
cannot do, and 2. it demands that we understand language as in essence 
serving this representational purpose, hence justifying the exclusive focus 
on propositions, and the exclusion of the normative and evaluative role 
language has. The work of Travis, Baz and Ebersole, in addition, I would 
argue, to the pioneering work of Harold Garfinkel and Harvey Sacks, 
show the error in such a stance.
 2.2. The Question of Process Internalism
If the arguments of the radical contextualists are valid, as I believe they 
are, then contextual factors, the social practices in which language is 
embedded, are an essential, ineliminable, part of what we do with that 
language; moreover, the descriptive or representational role language 
might play is not separable from the normative and evaluative roles. The 
desire to surgically extract propositions from language use, put them in 
the head or behind the skin so as to build a representational theory of 
cognition upon them, is akin to the baker trying to extract the egg from 
the cake because they need more eggs to glaze the cake. So much, so bad, 
for content internalism and propositionality.
So, I agree with Rowlands about the prospects for content internalism, 
in light of such arguments. However, what interests me equally are not so 
much the arguments which Rowlands advocated in his 2002 book, but 
the argument from which he was keen to distance himself. For, while 
advocating content externalism, Rowlands was keen on ensuring his 
reader did not take his target to be the status of mental processes. For while 
much of Rowlands’ book is devoted to arguing that the content of, or the 
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meaning our thoughts have, is not, as Descartes and his followers assume, 
internal (in our heads or behind our skin) but is irreducibly external, he 
resists challenging the thought that the processes are in our heads or behind 
our skin. Rowlands’ thought seems to be that while rejecting content 
internalism is a sound position to defend (even if still seen by many as 
radical), rejecting process internalism would just be plain wrong-headed—
we all know that it is our brains that do the processing, right?
 2.3. Rejecting ‘Process’ Internalism: Wittgenstein 
and Merleau-Ponty
What should we make of this reluctance to continue the move from 
rejecting content internalism to also rejecting, or at least questioning, pro-
cess internalism? Denying process internalism is, even for externalist radi-
cals such as Rowlands, a step too far it would seem, at least it was in 2002. 
Two thoughts sprung to mind as I read Rowland’s balking at extending 
his critique to process internalism, both thoughts are inspired by 
Wittgenstein.
 1. We need to be mindful of the metaphorical status of ‘process’ in the 
term ‘mental process’, and subject its use to interrogation. (cf. 
Wittgenstein, 2009, § 308)
 2. We should also subject to questioning the assumption that such ‘pro-
cesses’, if we are to use that term, must be things of which it makes 
sense to predicate that they are inner or outer. (cf. Wittgenstein, 2009, 
§ 293 & 304)
Metaphors can lead us astray, as Wittgenstein puts it, they can lead us to 
‘predicate of the thing what lies in the mode of representation’ 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, § 104); or, in more expansive language and drawing 
on the terminology of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2003), in employing the metaphor of ‘process’ we import gram-
matical rules from the source domain into the target domain, and these 
imported rules constrain us in our reflections. So, the grammatical rules 
to which the term is subject, when employed in its source domain, where 
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the term ‘process’ is used non-metaphorically, are carried over into the 
target domain, where we employ the term metaphorically, in this case, in 
our reflections on our ways of acting in and on, and responding to loci of 
significance in, the world. The result is that our reflections on our mental 
life and our object-involving abilities become constrained by our mode of 
representation, by our metaphorical employment of certain terms and 
the grammatical rules that they bring with them from their source domain.
This concern about the metaphorical use of ‘process’ constraining us 
because it carries-over grammatical rules from its source domain can then 
be put alongside our second concern, which is about the applicability of 
the inner-outer distinction. We can bring these two concerns together in 
the following proposal: let us for a moment exchange the metaphorical 
employment of the word ‘process’ for use of the word ‘act’ and talk instead 
of mental acts. When we talk of mental acts rather than mental processes we 
are less likely to be led astray and yet I can think of nothing lost. One 
thing we might gain in such an exchange is a clearer appreciation of the 
apparent senselessness of thinking in terms of the phenomena under dis-
cussion as having to be necessarily either inner or outer. Acts are not 
things that take place either in the head/behind the skin or external to the 
person, outside their head or beyond their skin. Actions are the doings of 
people, or, less awkwardly put: people act. The analogy we should draw 
upon when thinking about our mental life, we might suggest, is the 
organism acting in and on the world, not it’s digestive organs processing 
food. The grammar of the term ‘act’ does not seem to force upon one the 
inner/outer question and thereby generate the problems we’ve discussed 
in this section. Thought of this way, such that we want to use the word 
‘process’ to refer to mental acts, we are not obliged to invoke the gram-
matical rules they import, and thus mental processes, if we must talk this 
way, are not something for which it makes sense to say that they are either 
inner or outer.
The forgoing reflections are inspired by Wittgenstein, but there are 
other routes by which one might get here and arrive at the conclusion 
that commitment to process internalism should be rejected along with 
the commitment to content internalism. Indeed, I began this chapter by 
drawing attention to the turn to the New Sciences of the Mind, the 4E 
approach, Ecological Psychology and Enactivism. We might note that all 
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of these emerge out of phenomenologically-informed critiques, with the 
work of Merleau-Ponty being the most widely, though not exclusively, 
cited by those offering alternatives to the Cartesian tradition: e.g. the 
aforementioned Lakoff and Johnson cite Merleau-Ponty as a chief influ-
ence in their book Philosophy in the Flesh (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), the 
father of Ecological Psychology, James Gibson, was influenced by, and 
Ecological Psychology has evolved, developed and been defended against 
critics by drawing on, Merleau-Ponty (Heft, 1989, 2001; Glotzbach & 
Heft, 1982; Costall, 2003, p. 321), and the Enactivist movement in its 
origins, in Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s book The Embodied Mind 
(1991) was also heavily influenced by Merleau-Ponty (see for example 
Hutto, 2013, n. 1).
If we put these considerations about the status of mental acts alongside 
those rehearsed with clarity by Rowlands regarding content externalism, 
then we see how the philosophical foundations of traditional representa-
tionalist cognitive science become seriously philosophically destabilised. 
For representationalists, operating within the Cartesian tradition, mental 
processes are theoretically postulated computational processes, which pro-
cess input to produce contentful representations, which have proposi-
tional form.
 2.4. Empirically-Discerned Philosophical Objections 
to Representationalism
So much for the philosophical arguments against traditional representa-
tional cognitivism. When one looks to empirical work, the news for rep-
resentationalists isn’t much better, for in addition to the philosophical 
deflation of the requirement to theorise inner representational mental 
processes we also find objections emerging from robotics labs (Brooks, 
1999; Wheeler, 2005, chap. 8) and primate research (see for example 
Barrett, 2011). These authors cite empirical areas of research which serve 
to demonstrate the inability of the representationalist programme to 
accommodate the empirical data, without bringing into question its 
foundational philosophical assumptions. It is important not to draw 
 too- firm a distinction between these empirically-inspired objections and 
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the philosophical arguments of the previous sections. Louise Barrett’s 
(Barrett, 2011, 2018) work on primate cognition is empirically grounded 
and informed but leads her to question the representationalist philosoph-
ical assumptions that permeate the field and to recommend an alterna-
tive, Wittgensteinian, philosophical approach and advocate Radical 
Enactivism. Michael Wheeler’s work on Evolutionary Robotics (Wheeler, 
2005) emerges from empirical research in robotics labs, which leads him 
to question representationalist philosophical assumptions and to recom-
mend an alternative, Heideggerian, philosophical approach which has 
been incorporated into recent work in Ecological Psychology (see 
Chemero, 2009) and Enactivism. Ezequiel Di Paolo’s work on 
Evolutionary Robotics (Di Paolo, 2003) emerges from empirical research 
in robotics labs, which leads him to question representationalist philo-
sophical assumptions and to recommend an alternative, Merleau- 
Pontyan, philosophical approach and advocate Enactivism (Stewart 
et al., 2010).
 2.5. Paradigm in Crisis or Pre-Paradigm Stage?
It is tempting, therefore, to depict representationalist cognitive science as 
a paradigm in crisis. For it is one thing to have philosophers employ 
deflationary arguments which serve to show internalism is at best non- 
obligatory and at worst senseless, but another to find that your theory 
faces epistemological crises in domains which should be the sites of its 
greatest success, such a robotics labs and primate cognition, and which 
lead those working in these fields to question the foundational philo-
sophical assumptions of the programme. Cognitive science is, therefore, 
not a paradigm in crisis, but a loosely tied-together programme of research 
which has failed to establish itself as normal science, and which is, there-
fore, in Kuhnian terms, still in the pre-paradigmatic phase. It might be 
that to achieve the status of normal science, to achieve paradigm status, 
cognitive science must switch-out its Cartesian assumptions and replace 
these with philosophical insights which draw on Wittgenstein (e.g. 
Hutto, 2013), Heidegger (e.g. Wheeler, 2005), or Merleau-Ponty (e.g. 
Gibson, 1979; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).
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Will it be enough to switch-out one philosophical framework for 
another? Will this give us a science of the mind, or might we find that the 
critiques we’ve seen counting against Cartesian representationalism cut 
deeper? Before we address this question in the context of Ecological 
Psychology, let’s briefly consider the historical roots of the philosophical 
traditions we’re discussing.
 3. Two Philosophical Traditions: Aristotelianism 
and Cartesianism
Before we consider ecological psychology in more detail, let’s reflect a 
little more on the mind from a philosophical perspective. Something 
happens in the course of the history of Western philosophy, such that 
thinking of matter and soul, or body and mind, as distinct substances 
becomes the norm. The standard, textbook, story is that this happens 
with Descartes, but I think this story is wrong, to a large extent. One 
might argue that in Ancient Greek thought one found a kind of prefigur-
ing of Modern dualism in Plato, while Aristotle provided an alternative 
monist account. With the rise of Christianity and theological renditions 
of Aristotle’s philosophy, Aristotelian monism is corrupted. The 
Aristotelian monist alternative to Platonic thinking, in Christian guise, 
becomes itself rendered in to a pre-Cartesian substance dualism of body 
and spirit, in Aquinas, for example, motivated by the Christian theolo-
gians’ desire to separate the earthly body from the divine soul (see, e.g. 
Kenny, 1989). The modern era, for which Descartes is the towering fig-
ure in the Western philosophy of mind, therefore fails adequately to 
break free from the Christian corruption of Aristotelian monism. If we 
return to Aristotle, what we see is mind or soul not depicted as distinct 
from matter, but rather conceived of as matter with particular form. So, 
on this (uncorrupted) Aristotelian monist conception, the human mind 
simply is matter with human form, which, in virtue of this form, exhibits 
a particular set of objecting-involving and problem-solving abilities and 
capacities (see, e.g. Nussbaum & Putnam, 1992; Kenny, 1989). We 
might refer to this as Ecological-Organism thinking, in opposition to 
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dualist thinking, about the mind. The interest is in the whole organism, 
situated and embedded in, and thus part of, its ecosystem, in opposition 
to thinking about a body with a mind (dualism one) standing in causal 
relationship to its world (dualism two).
The reason for this very brief discussion of the history of the idea of the 
soul or mind in the Western tradition is to emphasise that there’s prece-
dent for thinking about our mental capacities in an embodied, embed-
ded, enacted and extended way, which draws on resources which predate 
Gibson’s work on affordances, predate early enactivism which emerged in 
the 1980s, and which predate the Twentieth Century phenomenology of 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty and the philosophy of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. For we might see this ‘New Science of the Mind’, 4E 
Cognition, Radical Enactive Cognition and Ecological approaches as, 
broadly speaking, operative within this alternative Aristotelian monist 
tradition, in contrast to the Christian and Cartesian inheritance one sees 
in the representationalist tradition of Cognitive Science.
Just as representational cognitive science is but one way of working 
within the Cartesian framework, and just as within representationalist 
accounts there are a number of competing theories, so too for the, 
broadly-speaking, Aristotelian Monist tradition, or for ecological- 
organism approaches. What I want to do in what follows is examine con-
temporary Ecological Psychology as one approach which tries to work 
within an Aristotelian framework and in doing so I will offer some criti-
cisms from within. For while my own philosophical predilections are, on 
these terms, broadly Aristotelian, I will suggest that such predilections are 
not, ultimately, satisfiable by Ecological accounts, including those which 
incorporate Enactivism (Chemero, 2009), which advance the theory of 
affordances.1 Why this is so will pick-up on our argument earlier about 
the irreducibly-contextual nature of language and the placing of the dis-
tinction between pertinent and absurd responses. Ultimately, Ecological 
Psychology is caught on the horns of a dilemma: retain a rigorous natu-
ralism and fail the absurdity (and abhorrence, and taste, and so on) test. 
Or, forego naturalism and factor-in ethical and aesthetic concerns into 
the definition of affordances and you lose the grounds for speaking the 
language of affordance rather than the language of concepts.
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 4. Ecological Psychology and the Theory 
of Affordances
Ecological Psychology was initiated by James Gibson, but has been devel-
oped since by a number of authors. Prominent among those authors who 
have followed Gibson are Harry Heft (Heft, 1988, 2001), Alan Costall 
(Costall, 1995, 2017) and Anthony Chemero (Chemero, 2003, 2009).
For Gibson, perception is action guiding (that is its function) and it is 
direct (no processing and no representations). Information is picked-up 
from the environment in the flow of perception as we move through the 
environment. Information exists as a product of the relation between, for 
example, light, surfaces and medium, such that when the light, reflecting 
off the surfaces and travelling via the medium converges at a specific 
point (say, the eyes of the perceiver) it provides directly, without the need 
for any kind of cognitive processing, information about the kinds of 
action afforded to the perceiver by the features of the environment, given 
the abilities of the perceiver. This, Gibson proposes, gives us an account 
of information pick-up which is non-representational, and it draws on a 
conception of information which is, we might say, sub-propositional. 
Perception is, therefore, of affordances for behaviour. What is perceived 
is not objects in the environment, nor the properties of objects in the 
environment, but rather features of a situation, which includes the per-
ceiver, though those features are not perceiver-dependent, ontologically 
speaking. For as the perceiver perceives they do so as this perceiver, with 
these attributes and abilities, located here. The account of information 
pick-up should provide the basis on which such information specifies 
affordances: opportunities for behaviour for the perceiver.
The philosophical challenge is this: how do we conceive of this particu-
lar, Ecological, mode of responsiveness to loci of significance in the envi-
ronment, which avoids representationalism, and the invoking of 
propositional contents, while not collapsing into purely causal accounts, 
which are content-free? For, it is important not to be distracted by the 
flush of the new, as it were, into forgetting knotty old problems. There is 
a question that needs asking of all such accounts, and that question might 
be represented in the following way: we have a scale, at one end of the 
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scale we have matter and causal relations only. At the other end of the 
scale we have conceptually mediated relations which can be represented 
in language. The conceptually mediated relations thereby afford us the 
ability to be responsive to the meaning the world has for us, which is 
irreducible to its purely material structure, affords us the ability to act on 
reasons, and enables us to offer reasons in support of our actions.
Ecological Psychology seeks to find middle ground. For, if we rely on 
a conception of information which is propositional, then, the thought is, 
we open the door to the representationalists. Gibson has already made it 
clear that this is not an option for him. However, if we go purely causal, 
in our desire to slam the door on representationalists, we ultimately leave 
open the back door to the representationalists, because something needs 
to give content to the causal impacts on our senses. Gibson’s theory initi-
ates a programme of research in which those Ecological Psychologists 
who have followed him have attempted, within the bounds he set, to 
provide a naturalistic account of perceptual information ‘pick-up’ in the 
theory of affordances, which resists a slide into purely causal accounts 
(because: no information), but which doesn’t require the theoretical pos-
tulation of representations or cognitive processes (because: information 
comes at too high cost).
We might put this in Sellarsian terms. Ecological Psychology sets itself 
the task of finding the middle ground between the kind of intelligibility 
found operative in the Space of Reasons and that which is operative in 
the natural sciences, without collapsing into either. While it is tempting 
to remark: Good luck with that!, let’s try to assess the merits of the attempt.
Gibson was, on the assessment of even his most staunch defenders, 
somewhat sketchy and perhaps even vague when it came to the details of 
his theory of affordances. Consequently, much of the work of those 
Ecological Psychologists who have followed has been comprised of pro-
viding detailed accounts of affordances. The accounts vary quite radically. 
One way in which they vary we might state as an ontological dispute 
between affordances as properties (Reed, 1996; Heft, 2001) and 
 affordances as features (Chemero, 2003). Another point of divergence is 
between those who remain committed to a strictly naturalist account of 
affordances (Reed, 1996) and those who open up the account to sociali-
sation and enculturation (Costall, 1995). Of course, depending on where 
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one goes with this will, to reinvoke our Sellarsian framework, determine 
whether affordances are subject to the kind of intelligibility belonging to 
the Space of Reasons or that belonging to the Natural Sciences.
Gibson explicitly aimed for the latter. It was crucial to Gibson, and to 
many of those theorists of affordances who have followed him, that affor-
dances were located within the space of natural scientific explanation. 
The problem is that in doing so one restricts quite radically the kind of 
information that might be considered available to perception.
So, let us consider some examples of perceiving opportunities for 
behaviour in the environment. Consider climbability. Let us say you are 
passing through the environment, perhaps on a walk across town and 
through the park, with a 10 year old child. The child loves to climb, and 
certain features of the environment (the environment includes you and 
the child, it is not external to you, on this account), as you pass through 
it, afford climbability. They do so because of how the abilities of the child 
serve to bring alive certain aspects of the environmental features which 
are perceived as affordances of climbability or climbing affordance. 
There’s the 120 cm high dry-stone wall—lots of places for foot and hand 
holds—but not the 3 metre high brick wall—it’s just too high and too 
smooth. There’s the old oak tree, with strong, low and approximately 
horizontal branches, but not the spruce tree next to it. There’s the dedi-
cated climbing wall, with the coloured hand and foot holds, where the 
colours indicate levels of difficulty, which has been built in the local play-
ground. All of these are the kinds of examples of affordances you will find 
in the literature and discussed by Ecological Psychologists delivering talks 
at conferences. They’re good examples which afford a rudimentary grasp 
of the theory of affordances, if you will.
 5. The Missing ‘E’—Ethical Affordance, 
Evaluative Perception, Concepts 
and Affordances as Rhetoric
However, there is something too easy about these examples. There’s some-
thing missing. Such examples are good for illustrating affordances, and 
the theory, to the uninitiated, but somewhat partial if we want to estab-
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lish a theory of perception and action. One-sided diets of examples are 
apt to lead us astray. To avoid straying we should always look for the 
examples which don’t quite fit so obviously. So, to this end we might ask 
what of the statue of Mahatma Gandhi that you pass on the walk across 
town, or the statue of the Emily Pankhurst? To be sure these both have 
certain properties that given the body-scale and abilities of your ten-year- 
old companion would provide excellent climbing opportunities. But do 
they afford climbability? The question as to whether they do or do not is 
an ethical question. The Ecological Psychologist has to give an account as 
to how such ethical considerations can be bracketed-out of our percep-
tion of affordances or how they might be included, in a kind of robust, or 
thick, evaluative perception.
Indeed, let us consider another example, that of affording urine-up- 
against-ability, or p-affordance, for brevity. For various reasons, male 
humans urinate against vertical surfaces. If one needs to urinate, one 
looks for a vertical surface to urinate against. There are numerous reasons 
for this which draw on considerations of hygiene, privacy (in most human 
cultures), shelter from the effects of wind which otherwise might lead to 
wearing the urine rather than disposing of it down a drain or into the 
ground. Is p-affordance an affordance in Gibson’s sense? It seems to draw 
upon considerations which quite clearly imply enculturation. 
Furthermore, as with our examples of climbability, there are unavoidable 
ethical boundaries here too. It is an unfortunate fact that the doors of 
closed retail stores in city centres in the UK seem to offer p-affordance at 
certain times of night for people who have reached certain levels of 
alcohol- induced intoxication, though they don’t do so during daylight 
hours for sober occupants of the same city centre. Similarly, my next door 
neighbour’s Great Dane, Frank, stood stationary on the grass in front of 
our houses, doesn’t offer p-affordance, though it is rumoured that for it, 
prior to a few months of intensive training, stationary children offered 
p-affordance.
The problem these examples present is that any account of affordances 
needs to have internal to it the grounds for excluding or including such 
evaluative, normative and ethical considerations. So, including moral 
evaluation would demand an account of evaluative perception which 
involves a kind of Aristotelian account of second nature or a Deweyan 
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account of moral training. While I would be amenable to such accounts, 
this would take us a long way from Gibson’s naturalist account of affor-
dances and stimulus information, provided by light reflecting off surfaces 
as we move through the environment. Indeed, such a robust, or thick 
conception of evaluative perception, seems to be unavoidably conceptual 
and interwoven with enculturation. Again, for a philosopher operating 
within the Aristotelian tradition this does not of necessity present a prob-
lem, we could look to the sort of fieldwork conducted by 
Ethnomethodologists to bring some light here. However, it does present 
a problem for the Ecological Psychologist, and for anyone who wants to 
draw upon the theory of affordances to produce a non-representational 
approach to cognitive science.
The Ecological Psychologist is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Horn 
One: remain Gibsonian, even with the kinds of sophisticated adjust-
ments and additions introduced by Chemero in his Dynamical Systems 
Theory (Chemero, 2009, chap. 7.6) of Affordance, and one has to pro-
vide an argument to justify the bracketing-off of the ethical in affordance 
perception. I’ll wait.
Horn Two: Move beyond Gibson, and, as Costall (Costall, 1995) rec-
ommends, socialise affordances and, I suggest, you step on to a slippery 
slope which leads away from affordances and to concepts, and the claim 
that perception is conceptually mediated. The problem for Costall and 
those who follow him on this is that the language of affordances becomes 
little more than a kind of rhetorical gloss, designed to satisfy the natural-
ists. Indeed, our criticism can go further. Our discussion of Radical 
Contextualist Philosophy of Language demonstrated that abstracting 
propositions from their use in language, by people, in contexts amounted 
to abstraction from the very things that enabled propositions to have 
sense. Similarly, we would also have to charge our Ecological Psychologist 
who has socialised affordances. Because in formalising our conceptual 
capabilities and rendering them theoretically as affordances, instead of 
carefully describing them, the Ecological Psychologist abstracts from 
that—our concepts—through which we come to register and respond to 




The issue might be stated as follows: it isn’t all about externalism, either 
content or ‘process’. The issues run deeper than that. Whether you’re a 
radical externalist, non-representationalist like Chemero (and Hutto and 
Myin), a centrist like Clark, or a conservative representationalist like 
Dretske and the early (circa 2003) Jesse Prinz there is still an aspect of the 
philosophical critique of cognitive science, which one can find in 
phenomenologically- informed critiques and Wittgenstein-informed and 
influenced critiques, not-to-mention Ethnomethodological critiques, to 
which these non-representational accounts are exposed just as are repre-
sentationalist accounts. Put another way, the problem isn’t just about rep-
resentations and internalism.
We are responsive to loci of significance in our environment, and we 
need to be honest about what is packed in to the term ‘significance’. To 
reinvoke the sliding scale introduced in the previous section:
• if we locate ourselves too far to one end of the scale, we simply cannot 
give an adequate account of the nature of that significance, because 
we’re trying to account for significance, which can be evaluative, even 
ethical, in purely causal terms. In Sellarsian terms, we remain, at best, 
trapped in the space of natural scientific explanation, and at worst, we 
fall for the Myth of the Given, unable to account for our ability to act 
on reasons, offer reasons for actions and account for the evaluative 
practices that permeate our existence and shape our world, including 
ethical practices.
• If we shift to the other end of the scale, then accounting for our ability to 
act on reasons, offer reasons for actions and the evaluative practices that 
permeate our existence, including moral practices, seems to demand that 
we have linguistic capacities and the ability to form propositions. This 
seems too strong-a-demand, and it was certainly unacceptable to Gibson.
Enactivists and Ecological Psychologists have tried to find the middle 
ground, by rejecting representationalism and going outer. What I’ve tried 
to show here is that, in the case of Ecological Psychology, the problem I’ve 
here stated with reference to Sellars, actually remains, only now reframed 
4 The Missing ‘E’: Radical Embodied Cognitive Science… 
124
as a debate about how to conceive of, or which is the best theory of, affor-
dances. It is, however, the same problem. Ecological Psychology and the 
theory of affordances is not a solution to the problem outlined by Sellars, 
but is a reframing of it. We are still left with the puzzle as to how to 
account for our distinctive responsiveness to loci of significance in the 
environment which does not, in pursuit of the goal, destroy or dismantle 
the very phenomena we’re trying to explain. For as the radical contextual-
ist philosophers of language showed how representationalism renders our 
language incapable of playing the normative, evaluative and, indeed, the 
representational role it does in our lives by abstracting the proposition 
from its uses by members of social orders, in contexts and on occasions, so 
Ecological Psychologists render our perceptual capacities incapable of 
playing the role they do in our lives such that we perceive, are responsive 
to and act on norms and values as these are interwoven in to the features 
of events, and they do so by abstracting ‘perception’ from our conceptual 
capacities and treating it theoretically for their own formal analytic purposes.
Of course, some Ecological Psychologists are aware of the limits their 
formal-analytic abstractions have imposed, and so, like Costall, they seek 
to mitigate the damage. The consequences of moves, such as those made 
by Costall, is that they unwittingly demonstrate the extent to which it is 
the very language, the formal-analytic, theoretical language, of affor-
dances that generates the problem to which they are now seeking a solu-
tion. For, if we instead forgo the theory and look, really look, at humans 
as members of social orders interacting with each other and the world, in 
social settings, and describe what we see in the language available to those 
members then we will resist the pitfalls of abstraction, and have a 
 particularist account of the human capacity to be responsive to loci of 
significance in their environment, which captures the normative, evalua-
tive and ethical richness of our lives.
Note
1. It should also be noted that I don’t believe that Aristotelian monistic pre-
dilections were or can be satisfied by a return to the substance of Aristotle’s 
own account. He initiates this tradition, or at least he is one of the early 
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towering figures in Western monism, but his own arguments are too 
metaphysical to be satisfactory. The Aristotelian monist tradition needs 
completing by drawing upon Wittgensteinian and Ethnomethodological 
insights, in my view. But that, as they say, is for another time.
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